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The reluctance of the federal courts in previous cases to declare moral turpitude to be
present may be explained by the fact that those cases involved deportation proceedings, while the state cases involved the less serious issue of the revocation of licenses.
Since the consequences of moral turpitude attaching to a crime often result in the
infliction of additional punishments of a more or less severe nature, it is unfortunate
that the word does not possess a more definite meaning than it does under the majority
approach. This approach, moreover, is inconvenient in that it necessitates an inquiry
into the details of the previous conviction.20 A possible solution might be the substitution in the statutes of the phrase "infamous crime. " 21 However, while such a substitution would permit certainty of prediction, the strict application of such a rule might
work injustice in many cases because of the application of the same standard regardless
of the issue involved.
It is suggested that the degree of moral degradation which should constitute just
cause for the termination of the marriage relationship is less than the degree which
should constitute just cause for forcibly taking a man away from his employment and
friends and expelling him from the country. Therefore the best solution would be a
statute specifically stating the length of sentence for a crime which provides grounds
for divorce, another length of sentence for grounds for deportation," and a third for
grounds for revocation of licenses. Perhaps the grounds for revocation of licenses might
be further limited to certain specified crimes which prove the offender to be peculiarly
unfit to continue to practice his particular profession. Such statutes would permit
both greater predictability of result and individuality of treatment than is now enjoyed through the haphazard definition by the courts of the term "moral turpitude."
E
Equity-Procedure-Enjoining Collection of Judgment for Service Charge on Confession Notes-[Illinois].-The plaintiffs were makers of three notes, each containing
a warrant of attorney permitting the defendant loan company to enter judgment "at
any time thereafter." Each note was secured by a chattel mortgage. judgments were
confessed by the defendant before the due dates specified. Motions to vacate were
twice denied. Having repaid the amount actually advanced on the notes, the plaintiff
sought an injunction against the collection of the portion of each note covering the
service charge for the loan. On appeal from a decree granting an injunction and discharging the mortgages, held, affirmed. Printers'Corp. and Howard, Wood, andFischer,
Inc. v. Hamilton Investment Co.,
10 In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284, 235 Pac. 772 (1925); Rudolph v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 487
(App. D.C. 1925). At times the federal courts apparently will refuse to inquire into the particular facts of a conviction, regarding the record of conviction as sufficient. United States
ex ret. Andreachi v. Curran, 38 F. (2d) 494 (D.C.N.Y. 1926). The instant case, however,
indicates a tendency away from that view. The court says: "An act which creates human
misery, corruption, and moral ruin ....is so base and shameful as to leave the offender not
wanting in the depravity which the words 'moral turpitude' imply." Surely the court would
not regard a violation of the statute because of some technical oversight as such a depraved act.
2"Divorce statutes similar to that of the District of Columbia use the concept of "infamy"
rather than that of "moral turpitude." Bums' Ind. Stat. 1933, c. 3, § 12o1; Dart's La. Crim.
Code 1932, § 138, 139; Mitchie's Tenn. Code 1938, § 8426.
22The proposed Kerr-Coolidge Act, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 10486, H.R. 8163 (1935), provided
that violations of state narcotic laws be made grounds for deportation. The bill did not pass.
1 295 Ill.
App. 34, 14 N.E. (2d) 5,7 (1938).
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In effect what the court has done here is to declare the service charge invalid and

nullify the statute which states that usury is not a defense between corporations 2 by
using an inconspicuous injunction statute. 3 The court's holding, however, is limited to
the fact situation and would not invalidate service charges generally, because it is
based on failure of consideration which the court finds in the attempt to collect before
the notes were due. It would seem that a ruling under this injunction statute would
have been foreclosed by the lower court's ruling on the motions to vacate. The statute
permits an injunction against so much of a judgment "as the plaintiff shall show himself equitably not bound to pay," and in the rulings on the motions to vacate the court
considered the equitable reasons for granting the relief sought. Thus the lower court's
rulings on the motions to vacate appear to be res adjudicataas to the validity of the
service charges by permitting their collection. Similarly, the denials of the motion
would seem to be res adjudicalaas to the question of failure of consideration relied on
by the court in the instant case. 4 Generally a service charge such as was involved here
is not held to be invalid,s which seems to point to the recognition of the fact that many
loans could not profitably be made at the legal rate of interest and that the means of
making it profitable for private capital to handle these loans is to permit them additional payment in the form of a service charge.6 Possibly a better solution might be
for the legislature to indicate in what situations and for what purposes more than the
present legal rate of interest might be charged.
Courts have repeatedly asserted that they exercise equitable jurisdiction in considering motions to vacate confession judgments.7 In the instant case, however, the
court stated that the plaintiffs did not have an adequate legal remedy in such a
proceeding:
While it is true that in motions to vacate judgments entered by confession it is said that
courts exercise equitable powers; yet we think it cannot be said that in such cases the court
exercises as broad equity powers as does a chancellor in a suit in equity.... We are of the
opinion that plaintiff's remedy in seeking to have the judgments by confession opened up and
for leave to defend, was not as complete and adequate as that afforded by a court of chancery. 8
Established precedents show courts using legal or equitable defenses9 as the basis for
granting a motion to vacate or to open a confession judgment with leave to defend;
2 Ill. Stat. 1937 c. 32 § 157.5. Construed in Tennat v. Joerns, 329 Ill. 34, 16o N.E. 16o
(r928); Ill. Stat. 1937, c. 74, §§ 4, 5, and 6.

3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937 c. 69 § 7.
4 Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496, 35 N.E. 732 (1893); Litch v. Clinch, 136 Ill. 410, 26 N.E.
579 (891) (res adjudicaa embraces not only the issue decided in a previous case but also
any other matter properly involved or which might have been raised and determined in the
former suit).
s However, service charges of one dollar ($r.oo) on each of six notes for $25.oo running from
one to six months were held to be usurious because they amounted to more than the statutory
interest limit of 8% per annum. Dickey v. Bank of Clarksdale, 184 So. Y4 (Miss. 1938).
6 Note Rendered Usurious by Service Charge, 56 Banking Law Journal 1, 4 (i939).
7 Blake v. State Bank of Freeport, 178 Ill. 182, 52 N.E. 957 (i899); Handly v. James Wilson
and John T. Wilson, 242 Ill. App. 66 (1926).
8
Printers' Corp. and Howard, Wood, and Fischer, Inc. v. Hamilton Investment Company,
295 Ill. App. 34, 38, 14 N.E. (2d) 517, 518 (1938).
9 Pearce v. Miller, 201 Ill. 188, 19o, 66 N.E. 221 (igo3), aff'g 99 Il. App. 424. "And if the
affidavits, when considered, should disclose a clear and equitable reason for opening the judg-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
procedural defects and irregularities do not provide adequate grounds for granting
such a motionxo In Condon v. Besse" on a motion to open a confession judgment the
court stated that where there is fraud or a meritorious defense or where a greater part
of the debt has been paid then the court on motion to vacate should enter a conditional
order allowing the debtors to interpose pleas, for, "if such means of correcting wrongs
did not exist, the defendant would be at the mercy of the plaintiff, unless relief was
sought in equity at much expense and delay."
When the plaintiffs' motions were denied it was not an end of their remedy at law
since they could have taken an appeal from the denial of their motion to vacate." The
basis of the appeal or writ of error is the denial of the motion to vacate, not the entering of the judgment originally.X3 Instead of following this course the plaintiff here
began a new suit in which he sought an injunction. In Hale v. Ferguson'4 which involved a bill to enjoin collection of a judgment against the complainant, the abstract
of the opinion, which is not fully reported, states the court's holding to be that a decree dismissing the bill was correct because the matter set up in the bill would have
been available at law as well as in equity. It might be argued that the plaintiff did not
have an adequate remedy at law in so far as the court of law could not declare the
chattel mortgages securing the indebtedness null and void as was done by the injunction. But the decree of the equity court was necessarily based on the theory that
the service charge was invalid and it would seem that the ruling on the motions to
vacate were res adjudicataon that point.
The court states as another ground for its decision that of failure of consideration
since judgment was confessed prior to the due date of the note.'s But this is. also contrary to the precedent that confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney similar
6
to that involved in this case is valid if taken before the due date specified in the note.
In reaching this conclusion the courts have stated that the power to confess judgment
for the face of the note before the due date was additional security for the creditors
-nd it was included in the various notes in question as an express stipulation which is
Aot defeated by the fact that the creditor may change the due date by confessing
ment and allowing appellants to plead, then it would be the duty of the court, in the exercise
of such equitable powers, to so order." Knox v. The Winsted Savings Bank, 57 Ill. 330 (1870).
1oBlake v. State Bank of Freeport, I78 Ill. z82, 52 N.E. 957 (I899); Moyses v. Schendorf,
238 Ill. 232, 87 N.E. 4o (I919); Mumford v. Tolman, '57 Ill.
258, 41 N.E. 617 (i895).
" 86 Ill. i59, 16i

(,877).

1 Boyles v. Chytraus, 175 IM.370, 51 N.E. 563 (z898); Van Pelt v. Lindley,

217

Ill. App.

405 (1920).

X3Lake v. Cook, 15 Ill. 353 (1854).

Ill. App. 156 (1914); Blake v. State Bank of Freeport, 178 Ill.
182, 184, 52 N.E. 957,
958, (1899). "A court of law, being invested with such power, will not send a defendant against
whom a judgment has been entered by confession, to a court of equity for redress, but the power, whether exercised by a court of law or of equity, is an equitable one, to be governed by the
same principles."
x5Printers' Corp. and Howard, Wood, and Fischer Inc. v. Hamilton Investment Co., 295
Ill. App. 34, 39, 14 N.E. (2d) 517, 519 (1938).
16Adam v. Arnold, 86 Ill. i85 (x877); Blanch v. Medley, 63 Ill.
App. 211 (1895).
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judgment.17 In the statement quoted above the court seems to recognize that its
decision is against established precedent and yet it feels justified in making the departure. It is probable that the court felt that the plaintiff had been caught between
two loan companies and deserved relief on whatever theory possible.
Not only does the decision seem to be unjustified on the basis of precedent but in
addition it appears to be contrary to the policy of the Illinois Civil Practice Act by
making a difference between the adequacy of relief available in an action to vacate
8
the judgment and that in the suit for the injunction. Section 44 of the Practice Act
permits a plaintiff to join any cause of action, legal or equitable, and a defendant to
set up any counterclaim, 19 legal or equitable. With reference to the portion of the
opinion quoted above the court states that" .... this distinction [of law and equity]
has not been entirely abrogated by Section 44 of our Civil Practice Act." Under some
codes providing for the union of law and equity the courts have not looked favorably
on such a move but instead have preserved the ancient distinctions and have dismissed
cases for procedural defects which codes were designed in part to eliminate2 ° Dean
Clark, writing shortly after the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, stated that such
anomalous results can be avoided under the new act, but to do so will require" ....
that the Illinois judges will seize on the opportunity afforded by the joinder provisions
to avoid such a result."" Professor McCaskill, however, seems to adopt a view similar
to that of the instant case when he states that, "In developing the one form of civil
action it is well to bear in mind that whatever else may have been abolished, actions
at law and suits in equity still remain, not, it is true, as independent systems of prowhich provides for both. Attempts to obscure this fact
cedure, butt within a system
2
lead only to confusion.""1
Thus by finding a difference between the relief granted in equity and at law the
court is preventing a simplification which the Practice Act is designed to attain and
which other states have achieved by stating in their codes that there shall be but one
civil action.24
Evidence-Constitutional Law-Inability of Wife To Waive Husband's Immunity
to Unreasonable Search and Seizure-[Illinoisj.-Whle the defendant was detained
in police custody on a charge of larceny, the complainant, accompanied by deputy
sheriffs, went to the defendant's home in search of the stolen goods. The defendant's
17 Sherman

v. Daddely, ii Ill. 622 (i85o).
is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. II0, § 168.
19.01. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. iio, § 162: "Subject to rules, any demand by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more co-defendants, whether in the
nature of set-off, recoupment, cross-bill in equity or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract,
for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross demand
in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim."
o See Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 209, 211 (i933).
2.td. at 215.
22McCaskill, One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure for the Federal Courts?
30 Ill. L. Rev. 415 (1935).
' See Fisher, Persistence of Chitty, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1939).
24Okla. Stat. 1893, c. 764, § 3882. Black v. Jackson, 177 U.S. 349 (1900).

